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Australian universities have in recent times been undergoing a substantial 
transformation in the way in which they are managed.  They have moved away from 
the (British-based) traditional collegiate model to one in which professional managers 
play a centre-stage role.  This paper investigates an important element of the 
managerialism at Australian universities, the market for what we call “academic 
executives” (AEs).  We analyse the remuneration of the top AEs at Australian 
universities over the past six years and show that institutional size is a dominant 
driving factor of remuneration, as has been found with compensation of CEOs in the 
private sector.  We also find the pay-size elasticity to be about 0.25 and is the same 
for both the university and private sectors; and remarkably, this value has also been 
found in previous studies on executive remuneration for the US and the UK. The 
remuneration schedule for the university sector is about half as steep as that for the 
private sector, suggesting that it is a much harder climb to the top of the corporate 
ladder.  We analyse the structure of remuneration among AEs and the Group of Eight 
universities are found to have a pay parity structure that is closest to that for the 










* We would like to acknowledge the research assistance of Germaine Chin, Effie Giaros, Daphnie Goh, 
Mei Han, Andrew Jones, Callum Jones, and Lisa Soh. In revising the paper, we have benefited from 
the comments of seminar participants at UWA, two anonymous referees and the Economics Editor of 
the AJM, Dr Chongwoo Choe. For a longer version of this paper, see Clements and Izan (2007) 
available at  
http://student.biz.uwa.edu.au/~kclement/Clements_Izan_Stairway_to_the_Top_Long_Version_June_2
007.pdf.  This research was financed in part by the UWA Business School.    
1. Introduction 
The role of academic executives at Australian universities has recently become 
more prominent for several reasons.  First, the complexity of the university sector has 
grown substantially, leading to increasing demands for administrative talent. Related 
to this are the growing external pressures from government and the general 
community for universities to be accountable and transparent in all their activities.  
Finally, the pressures for universities to raise funds from outside sources have come 
with its own administrative requirements.  These factors have led to the establishment 
of more elaborate administrative structures at most universities, a substantial increase 
in the demand for senior academics possessing administrative skills, and a noticeable 
growth in salaries paid to academic executives (AEs).  In a recent article published in 
the Higher Education Supplement of The Australian, Illing (2006) summarises these 
developments thus: 
A reshuffle at the top of the University of Sydney confirms a shift to 
US-style business managerialism at Australian universities in which a 
new layer of management, deputy vice-chancellors, wield 
unprecedented executive power…. Once simply the vice-chancellor’s 
assistant, deputy vice-chancellors over the past 15 years have assumed 
formidable authority, often overseeing billion dollar budgets.  About 
150 positions in Australian universities are designated deputy and pro-
vice-chancellors or their equivalents, up from 99 in 1996… 
 
Whether or not the rise of the AE is a desirable development and if their 
remuneration is “appropriate” are vexed questions involving much controversy.  The 
issues raised are more or less the same as those relating to executive compensation in 
the private sector:  How does an institution measure and reward superior executive 
performance?  Do executives get paid what they are really worth to the company, or is 
the market rigged in their favour at the expense of shareholders and other 
stakeholders?  Do Australian companies have to compete in a global market for 
executive talent, and thereby have no choice but to pay what might seem to be huge 
amounts?  Does the system promote the efficient allocation of resources, so that 
remuneration arrangements facilitate the best people getting to the top, at least on 
average?    
In this paper, we analyse the remuneration of academic executives at Australian 
universities in order to shed some light on these issues.  In particular, we analyse the 
remuneration structure for the top five AE levels and the parity between levels to 
answer the question of whether the gradient is sufficiently steep to attract academics 




analyse whether AE remuneration is determined in more or less the same manner as 
that for executives in the private sector.   A key finding in the existing literature is that 
company size tends to be the dominant factor driving the remuneration of executives 
in the private sector.  Does a similar finding hold for academic administrators?  If so, 
this would then constitute some prima facie evidence that fundamental common 
factors are at work in both sectors, so that universities would not have to be 
considered a “special case” requiring a unique analytical framework to understand 
their workings.  Our findings suggest that this is indeed the case, and interestingly, the 
size elasticity of pay is about the same in both sectors.  The marked difference 
between the private and university sectors is in the gradient of the remuneration 
structure:  the gradient is much steeper in the private sector, suggesting that it is a 
more difficult climb to the top.  We find that the remuneration structure of the Group 
of Eight universities, as reflected by the gradient, is closest to that for the private 
sector. 
We also provide evidence on how fast AE remuneration has grown in recent 
years, and how that compares with movements in salaries of academics who teach and 
conduct research and with the overall rate of inflation.  Data over the last five years 
suggest that AE remuneration has increased at a rate almost twice that for teaching 
and research staff. In addition, we identify which universities consistently “pay more” 
and which “pay less”, after controlling for size.  Queensland and Monash appear to be 
consistently above average payers of their AEs. 
The only prior work on this topic relates to the remuneration of university Vice-
Chancellors/Presidents.
1 But we believe that this work can be usefully broadened to 
consider the role, workings and remuneration of the academic executive team as a 
whole.  Analysing the remuneration of only one member of an academic executive 
team in isolation neglects the possibility of important complementarities or 
“synergies” among members of the team, whereby, for example, it may be possible to 
compensate for a poor Vice-Chancellor with a strong Deputy and vice versa.   
There are three reasons for studying academic executives. Firstly, universities are 
now substantial businesses, with significant annual budgets, and yet there has been 
very little study about how their CEOs and other executives are remunerated.  This is 
in part due to the lack of remuneration data until recently.  Secondly, for various 
reasons, including simple gossip, there is a great deal of interest in how much VCs get 
paid.  For example, the headline in a recent Australian Financial Review article 
                                                 




screams “Top academic scores a million” (Lebihan, 2007).  Thirdly, universities have 
moved away from having a flat structure to one that is more hierarchical with the 
emergence of Faculty Deans, Pro- and Deputy Vice-Chancellors, making it interesting 
to study the pay disparities among their top executives and the incentives they provide 
for academics to move into administration. 
 
2. The Nature of Academic Executives and their Remuneration 
  At a typical Australian university, there would be something like six academic 
executives, including the Vice-Chancellor, the Deputy Vice-Chancellor and several 
Pro Vice-Chancellors.  At a broad level, these individuals have responsibility for the 
overall management of the university, including functions such as leadership, 
representation, teaching and learning, research, staffing, legislative and compliance.  
In this section we discuss aspects of the nature of these positions. 
As mentioned above, in recent years the number of AEs at most universities 
has risen substantially.  Aitken (2005), former Vice-Chancellor of the University of 
Canberra, describes the situation rather cheekily in the following way: 
A common complaint around the campus over the past 20 years 
or so has been the growth of “managers” or “management”.  A 
specific version is the displacement of “real academics” 
(usually the speaker and friends) by “wasteful”, “useless”, Pro 
Vice-Chancellors and the like.  A favourite jibe has been 
“plastic men”, from PVC, no doubt.  
Aitken then goes on to attribute the growth in AE numbers to the increased scale of  
operation of the typical university and  the more onerous compliance requirements to 
which universities are subject.  Expanding on Aitken’s thesis, there are several other 
reasons for the growth in the number of AEs, including the increased regulation from 
Commonwealth and State governments, and associated reporting requirements; the 
rise of multi-campus universities (especially following mergers); the greater emphasis 
on foreign students and in many cases, offshore teaching programs; more fee-paying 
students; and the pressures to diversify sources of funding away from government.  In 
short, the greater size and complexity of universities have increased their management 
requirements and consequently more AEs. 
  A popular explanation of executive remuneration in the private sector is 
“tournament theory”, according to which the structure of pay within a company can 
be understood by analogy with a professional sports competition, such as a tennis 




prize, so the tournament is of “the winner-take-all” variety.  All players have the 
common objective of winning the tournament and collecting the substantial prize 
money.  Although only one player ends up collecting the prize, it is the possibility of 
winning the prize that motivates all competitors to play hard.  The workings of the 
tournament mean that the absolute ability of players is immaterial, as in each game 
one player’s abilities are compared to another’s, with the winner being relatively 
better than the other.  Luck and talent combine to determine the winner of the 
tournament.  The expected value of the size of the prize provides the incentive for 
players to compete hard and thereby produce “exciting tennis”.  Accordingly, if the 
probability of winning falls, as would happen if additional players were permitted to 
enter the tournament, then in order to offset the deleterious effect on incentives and 
maintain the same level of tennis, organisers would have to offer a larger prize.  
In a corporate setting, it is not a winner-take-all environment with executive 
remuneration, but one in which the spread between remuneration at various levels 
provides the motivation for employees to work hard and compete for a promotion.  
Lazear (1995, p. 4) emphasises the importance of not considering the remuneration of 
one executive of a company by itself, but rather comparing it with remuneration at 
lower levels: 
...Compensation must be treated as an entire structure, not as a 
collection of separately determined components.  The wage of 
a vice-president cannot be set independent of an assistant vice-
president because the vice-president’s wage affects the desire 
of all those below him to obtain the job.   
 
Where luck plays an important role in determining executive success, on the basis of 
tournament theory we would expect to see a larger spread in remuneration in order to 
provide the appropriate incentive for employees.  For example, in the extreme case in 
which promotion is determined on the basis of the toss of a coin, luck plays the only 
role, personal effort is irrelevant and employees have no incentive to work hard.  As 
in many instances it is difficult, if not impossible, to get an accurate measure of the 
absolute worth of an employee to a company, an appealing feature of tournament 
theory is that it requires only relative worth -- one employee as compared to another -- 
something that is easier to measure.  
As mentioned above, tournament theory has implications about the structure 
of compensation in the hierarchy to generate incentives for individuals to win the 
tournament prize.  Tests of the theory have been conducted for sporting tournaments 




executives (Eriksson, 1999, Conyon et al., 2001, Rajgopal and Srinivasan, 2006 and 
Lee et al., 2005).  Eriksson (1999) used data in 210 Danish firms over the period 1992 
to 1995 to test various implications of tournament theory.  One finding which has 
direct relevance to our paper is that consistent with tournament theory, the pay 
differential increases as one moves up the corporate hierarchy. He also finds that such 
disparities increase in noisier business environments.   
In two recent papers, Lee et al. (2005) and Rajgopal and Srinivasan (2006) test 
the implications of tournament theory using recent US data on executive 
remuneration.  Lee et al. (2005) use a sample of 1855 companies over the period 1992 
to 2003 and find that firms with large dispersion in compensation among the top five 
executives have higher performance than comparable firms with lower dispersion.  
The relationship is stronger in firms with high agency costs and those with more 
effective governance structures. Rajgopal and Srinivasan (2006) also examine the pay 
disparity among the top five executives, but use even more recent data covering the 
period 1996 to 2004, during which there has been significant growth in executive pay.  
They find that on average, the maximum pay is about 4.7 times that of the minimum 
pay for the top five executives, suggesting relatively large pay disparities at the top.  
Their findings support implications of tournament theory – companies in riskier 
industries have greater pay dispersion than those in more stable industries. Pay 
disparities are also larger for larger and younger firms, and those with greater 
investment opportunities, higher turnover and “star executives”. 
A similar study conducted using UK data covering the 1990s by Conyon et al 
(2001) also supports the idea that the pay disparity increases as one moves higher up 
the corporate ladder.  They find that the ratio of the level one pay to level two pay is 
greater than the ratio of level two to level three. The premium from moving to level 
one from level two is between 41 to 70 percent, and that to level two from level three 
is lower at between 17 to 35 percent.  They also find that the prize for becoming CEO 
is larger when there are more “competitors” in the field, as proxied by the number of 
executives. Coupé et al. (2003) was one of the first to test the applicability of 
tournament theory to the academic market – departments of economics in 107 
universities.  They find that the salary gaps increases with rank, with compensation 
linked to performance at higher ranks. 
  No one could convincingly argue that the remuneration of academic 
executives is similar to that of corporate executives in all respects.  For one thing, 




after adjusting for size differences, Australian Vice-Chancellors are paid about 60 
percent less than Chief Executive Officers in the private sector, which perhaps reflects 
the psychic income derived from being a VC.  It would thus seem reasonable to think 
of the remuneration of AEs as being determined by an amalgam of factors, only some 
of which reflect the objectives of stakeholders and performance of the individuals.  
This mixture of determinants would seem to be consistent with the nuanced attitude 
towards remuneration expressed by former VC Don Aitken (2006): 
…I chose to align the VC’s pay to that of my staff, feeling that 
the VC needed to be seen as part of the university community, 
not somehow apart from it.  I thought I was worth twice a 
professorial salary and I made it clear to the union, which 
thought about it, and nodded.  It was accepted and there was 
never any fuss afterwards…Of course, I had other perks, 
notably a car and a house to live in .  On the other hand, for 12 
years I seemed to work a 24-hour day and to be permanently on 
call… 
I have always felt that the dictum “if you pay peanuts you 
get monkeys” was rubbish.  The role of the Vice-Chancellor is 
a difficult one but a wonderful job for the right person -- and 
for that person the money is incidental. 
 
But with the substantial recent growth in the remuneration of 
VCs, it could possibly be expected that more emphasis will be 
placed on their performance.   
 
Finally, what is known about the personal characteristics of the academic 
executives?  Given their importance and their rapid growth, it is surprising that there 
is little research on the nature of AEs in Australia, and what research there is deals 
only with Vice-Chancellors.  Vice-Chancellors are 55 years old on average when 
appointed and occupy their positions for an average of 6 years (Soh, 2007).  In 
comparison, Chief Executive Officers of publicly-listed companies in Australia on 
average are about 10 years younger when appointed, but interestingly they also have 
an average tenure of 6 years (Soh, 2007, Lieu, 2003).  Slattery (2007) in an article 
which deals with a heated dispute between the current and previous VC of Macquarie 
University ventures the following taxonomy of the personalities and management 
styles of the VCs: 
There are the gruff, no nonsense Vice-Chancellors, such as The 
University of Western Australia’s Alan Robson and the Australian 
National University’s Ian Chubb.  The University of Queensland’s 
John Hay and Melbourne University Glyn Davis are both 
politically astute, urbane and frighteningly well-read.  The 
University of NSW’s Fred Hilmer is a nerdy management theorist; 






3. How Much do Australian Universities Pay? 
Australian universities are obliged to disclose in notes to their published 
financial statements information regarding the remuneration of executives.  This takes 
the form of the number of executives falling within each $10,000 band, commencing 
at $100,000 (Australian Accounting Research Foundation, 1993, Australian 
Accounting Standards Board, 1997, DEST, 2000).  Our starting point is thus the 
annual report and financial statements that are produced by each university.  There are 
considerable differences in the amount of additional information about the nature of 
remuneration given in the notes to the accounts
2.  In the vast majority of cases, the 
reported information is only the remuneration by band.  In particular, individuals, or 
the corresponding positions, are not linked to the remuneration data.  By consulting 
the organizational chart presented in the annual report of each university, we can 
obtain some insights into who is paid what, by assuming that those in more senior 
positions are paid more. This is, of course, just a first approximation as there is no 
iron-clad rule that says remuneration always increases as we ascend the hierarchy.
3 
We collected information on remuneration data for 1999-2004 for over 30 
universities.  As the data are in the form of the number of people lying in each 
$10,000 band, we use the mid-point of the bands.  To give an example of the data, 
Table 1 presents remuneration in 2004 for 32 universities.   On average VCs received 
$474,000 in 2004.  The dispersion of VC pay, as measured by the standard deviation, 
is $169,000, or about 31 percent in logarithmic terms.  As can be seen from column 2 
of the table, VCs at UNSW and Queensland are the highest paid. Column 3 of the 
table reveals that UNSW and Queensland also pay their “number two person” higher 
than other universities.  Column 3 also shows that on average, occupants of the 
second highest position receive almost 40 percent less than the VC of their institution, 
and that the relative dispersion of their pay is about 26 percent, a little less than that of 
VCs.  Other features of Table 1 include (i) members of the Group of Eight (Go8) tend 
to be better payers of their academic executives on average (column 7); and (ii) across 
universities, there are considerable differences in the structure of AE pay, as can be 
                                                 
2 For example, Murdoch University in their 2001 financial statements provided much more than the 
minimum requirements by giving full details of the remuneration of each individual position.  At the 
other end of the spectrum, a number of universities offer no clarification to the remuneration data, 
while others provide some modest information.  For further information, see Clements and Izan (2007). 





seen from the cross-sectional standard deviations given in columns 8 and 9.  The pay 
structure is very flat at Swinburne and Victoria, while it is much steeper at Charles 
Sturt University, The University of Newcastle and UNSW.   
 
Insert Table 1 
 
Figure 1 provides a visualisation of the “spread” of remuneration by plotting 
the highest, mean and lowest for each university, with universities ranked in terms of 
the mean.  To better represent the spread, we use a geometric scale for remuneration 
for the 21 universities that report data pertaining to both the highest and “average of 
5
th + highest”.  This figure shows that in proportionate terms, the spread is 
approximately constant, except at both ends of the distribution.  At the bottom, the 
spread shrinks, while it grows at the top.  On average over all universities, the VC 
earns about twice that of the fifth highest AE. For further details of the data, see 
Clements and Izan (2007). 
Insert Figure 1 
 
4. The Pay Parity Matrix   
A useful way of examining the relativities in remuneration for staff at the 
various levels, and the progression from lower levels to the top, is through the “pay 
parity matrix” (Clements and Izan, 2006).    The elements of the pay parity matrix 
enable us to make convenient comparisons of remuneration, its dispersion and the 
“steepness” of the stairway to the top. In this section, we discuss the nature of this 
matrix and its application to academic executives. 
Consider the comparison of the pay at a given university of the VC with that 
of an AE at level i  (i = 2,…,5), to be denoted by  1 P  and  i P , respectively.  We use the 
logarithmic ratio, defined as  ( ) i1 i 1 log P P π= , which we shall call the “parity” 
between the remuneration of level i and the VC. The relationship between the 
percentage difference  i1 p   and the parity  i1 π  is  ( )
i1
i1 p 100 e 1
π = ×− .  While pi1 is 
approximately 100 ×  i1 π  if Pi is not too far less than P1, as discussed in Clements and 
Izan (2006) the parity  ij π  has several advantages over the percentage  ij p  in measuring 
relative remuneration.
4 
                                                 
4 Briefly, there are three advantages: (i) As  ij ik jk, π =π −π the parity possesses an additivity property, 
making it independent of irrelevant levels. (ii) The parity is symmetric in the sense that if level i earns 




Table 2 provides the pay parities for the VC in terms of each of the lower 
levels, for each university in 2004. These parities are in the form of 
i1 i 1 log (P /P ) 0,   π= <  i = 2,…,5. Thus, looking at the first row, at Adelaide the AE 
who is second in the hierarchy earns about 28 percent less than the VC, number 3 
earns 80 percent less, while 4 earns 84 percent less
5. Surprisingly, there do not seem 
to be any further obvious patterns in the parities either across universities or across 
levels.  Figure 2 gives the same information for selected universities in each year of 
the period 1999-2004.  As the vertical scale of each Panel is the same, the graphs are 
directly comparable across universities in terms of both the means (the lengths of the 
columns) and the dispersion over time (the spread of the dots).  To illustrate the 
interpretation of this figure, consider RMIT (Panel 3):  Here as the heights of the 
columns decrease rapidly as we move from lower to higher levels (that is, as we move 
from left to right), the pay gradient is quite steep.  And as within each level the dots 
are reasonably spread out, there is a moderate degree of dispersion of each parity over 
time.  This is to be contrasted with the “neighbouring” University of  SA (Panel 4), 
where the gradient is much flatter and there is little dispersion with each level. In 
other words, there is more inequality in the distribution of remuneration over both 
levels and time at RMIT as compared to SA. 
 
Insert Table 2 
Insert Figure 2 
 
One way to visualise the workings of the parities  ij π  for i, j = 1,…,N is in the 
form of an N N ×  matrix Π .  This matrix has as ()
th i, j element  () ij i j log P P π= , which 
is remuneration of  level  i  relative to  j.  The matrix Π is skew-symmetric, that is, 
the diagonal elements are all zero, while  ij ji π =− π . We use the 1999-2004 
remuneration data for N = 5 levels to compute the Π matrix for each university and 
then average over the 33 universities, and Panel A of Table 3 contains the results.  
Thus going down the sub-diagonal immediately to the right of the main diagonal 
containing the zeros, and looking at  i,i 1 + π  for i = 1,…,4, we see that on average VCs 
earn about 42 percent more than the number 2 academic executive, number 2 about 13 
                                                                                                                                            
unrestricted domain, so it is less likely to have a skewed distribution. None of these properties is shared 
by the percentage difference. For details of these and other properties of pay parity matrix, see 
Clements and Izan (2006). 
5 These percentages are all approximations.  Using 100 × (
i1 e
π - 1), the exact percentage differences 





percent more than number 3, number 3 about 9 percent more than 4, and 4 earns about 
9 percent above number 5. Interestingly, if we strike out the row involving the VC, we 
see that among the lower ranks, only one parity exceeds 32 percent, viz.,  25 π , 
indicating a surprising degree of equality of pay among academic administrators other 
than VCs. 
  The remaining panels in Table 3 give the equivalent matrix for each group of 
institutions, namely, the Group of Eight (Go8), the Australian Technology Network 
(ATN), the Innovative Research Universities (IRU), and the universities which do not 
belong to any of these groups, designated “other”.
6  It is interesting to note that the 
Go8 universities have by far the largest disparity between the various levels, which 
suggests that for these universities, the “stairway to the top” is much steeper than for 
other universities. If we use the notion adopted from tournament theory, that the VC 
salary represents the “tournament prize”, the ultimate prize in the case of Go8 
universities is much higher, and possibly, much tougher to win, as the prize serves to 
attract better talent. The pecking order seems to be as follows: the Go8, followed by 
the IRU, then the other universities and the ATN. That is, we observe that on average, 
the VC at a Go8 university receives 86 percent more than the fifth highest individual, 
while the VC at an ATN university receives only 64 percent more. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
5. Remuneration across Institutions, Levels and Time 
In order to assess the impact of differences in the size of institutions on 
remuneration, we estimate the following regression by pooling across time, 
institutions and levels: 
(1)                   
==
∑∑ = α+β + δ + γ +ε
55
ict ct s s k k ict
s1 k2
logP logS Y L , 
      
where for university c and year t, Pict is the remuneration for executive at level i,  ct S i s  
the revenue, L2 to L5 are dummy variables for the four levels below the Vice-
Chancellor and Ys are the year dummies. The coefficient β   is the elasticity of 
remuneration with respect to size (the “size elasticity” for short).  The coefficients  2 γ  
                                                 






to  5 γ   measure the parity between the VC’s remuneration and those of lower-level 
executives.  
The estimates of equation (1), using pooled OLS, are presented in Table 4. In 
Panel B of the table, we also include a dummy for Go8 universities, and Panel C 
provides the results when we also include dummies for membership of the ATN and 
the IRU. Estimates of the year dummies indicate that on average, and after controlling 
for size and membership of particular groups of universities, academic executive 
remuneration in 2004 is approximately 29 percent higher than that in 1999. This 
compares with an increase of about 17 percent in the average salaries of academics at 
UWA over the same time period, which we take to be about the same nationwide.
7 
The approximate 29 percent increase in AE earnings can also be compared with the 
18 percent increase in the Consumer Price Index over the same period.
8 Clearly, the 
earnings of AEs have grown almost twice as fast as those of Teaching and Research 
(T&R) academics and the cost of living. 
Insert Table 4 
 
  Panel B of Table 4 also shows that Go8 universities, on average, pay their 
executives about 14 percent more than other universities, after controlling for size.  
When the Go8 dummy is included in the regression, the sensitivity of remuneration to 
size decreases, suggesting that the Go8 classification may in part measure the size 
effect.  When dummy variables for the ATN and IRU are added (Panel C), we see that 
on average, these universities pay lower than the Go8 universities, and about the same 
as other universities that are not members of any of these groups.  The results for the 
Go8 are different to those reported by Soh (2007) for Vice-Chancellors, possibly 
because our data are more recent than hers (which refer to 1995 to 2002). 
  In Table 5, we drill down further by introducing individual institution 
dummies to assess who pays significantly more or less than that expected on the basis 
of size and time effects. Panel A refers to all levels, and the coefficients for 
institutions are ranked in ascending order. The dominance of the Go8 as the top-
paying universities in the country is clearly evident here, with Monash, Queensland, 
NSW and Melbourne the leaders. For example, after allowing for size and year 
                                                 
7 This is based on professors’ salaries at UWA which increased from $94,788 in September 1999 to 
$110,748 in September 2004, and from $59,243 to $69,217 for Level B (step 6) academics. 






effects,  AEs at Monash on average receive about 95 percent more than those at James 
Cook, while at Queensland they receive 7 percent less than Monash (0.88 – 0.95 =      
-0.07).
9   ANU pays its executives, on average, the lowest amongst the Go8 
universities. Deakin is among the high payers and seems to be the outlier here, for 
reasons which we cannot fully explain.   
Insert Table 5 
 
  The ranking of universities based on VC salaries (Panel B of Table 5) does not 
vary a great deal from the ranking based on all academic executives, with the 
correlation between the ranks estimated at 0.96.  On the basis of Table 5, UQ has the 
highest paid VC in the country, followed by Monash, NSW and Sydney, all very large 
universities. The correlation between the ranking on the basis of AE remuneration and 
a ranking on the basis of size, proxied by revenue, is about 0.83.  The correlation 
between the ranking of universities on the basis of AE remuneration and that based on 
the Melbourne Institute Index of the International Standing of Australian 
Universities
10 is 0.73. The estimated coefficients for the year dummies in Table 5 
provide another “constant quality” index of AE remuneration over time. Controlling 
for size, levels and institutions, the remuneration of all AEs has increased by about 38 
percent (Panel A), while that of VCs has risen by almost 50 percent (Panel B), which 
is again far greater than the rate of inflation and the increase in T&R academic 
salaries over the same time period. 
 
6. Comparison with the Private Sector 
  In this section, we compare the structure of remuneration of academic 
executives with that of their private sector counterparts, using data on executive 
remuneration in the 300 public companies included in the S&P/ASX 300 index for 
2004 and 2005.
11 
  We pool the 2004
12  data for both the private and university sectors, and 
estimate the remuneration-revenue relationship for each of the executive levels, and 
include a “private sector” dummy.  The results from this regression are presented in 
Table 6.  Some interesting conclusions emerge from this analysis:  firstly, the size 
                                                 
9  Again, these percentages are approximations. Using 100 × (e
λ - 1) where λ is  the estimated 
coefficient for the relevant institution, the exact differences are as follows:  Monash AEs receive 159 
percent more than those at JCU, while at Queensland, they receive 6.8 percent less than Monash. 
10 Available at http://melbourneinstitute.com/publications/reports/MelbIndex.pdf 
11 The source for these data is the Australian Financial Review Executive Salary Survey, February 
2006. 





elasticity for all levels range between 0.25 and 0.28.  The finding that the size 
elasticity is approximately one-quarter is consistent with prior research as summarized 
by  Murphy (1999, p 2493): 
It is not surprising that compensation increases with company 
size; larger firms, for example, may employ better-qualified and 
better-paid managers (Rosen, 1982; Kostiuk, 1990). More 
surprising, at least historically, has been the consistency of the 
relation across firms and industries. Baker et al. (1988) 
summarize Conference Board data on the relation between CEO 
cash compensation and firm sales from 1973 to 1983 and 
document pay-sales elasticities in the 0.25-0.35 range, implying 
that a firm that is 10 percent larger will pay its CEO about 3 
percent more. Rosen (1992) summarizes academic research 
covering a variety of industries and a variety of time periods in 
both the US and the UK, concluding that the "relative 
uniformity [of estimates] across firms, industries, countries, and 
periods of time is notable and puzzling because the technology 
that sustains control and scale should vary across these disparate 
units of comparison."  
.  
 
Insert Table 6 
 
  Secondly, for all levels, remuneration is on average higher in the private sector 
as demonstrated by the positive coefficients the “private sector” dummy variables in 
all the regressions, a result which is not very surprising.  It is interesting, however, to 
see that the difference is largest for the CEO/VC (level one) with the coefficient for 
the private sector dummy estimated at 0.90, and decreases as we move down the 
hierarchy, with the coefficient estimated at 0.46 for level five. The estimate for the 
“private sector” premium for the CEO is similar to that found in Soh (2004).  Based 
on these estimates, we can calculate the average difference between the remuneration 
of private sector and university sector executives for each level.  For example, at the 
CEO level, an estimated coefficient of 0.90 indicates that private sector executives 
receive, on average, a remuneration that is about 2.5 times that of Vice Chancellors
13, 
and the fifth highest private sector executives receive, on average, a remuneration that 
is 1.6 times higher than the fifth highest university executives.  Note that as these 
multiples are “size adjusted”, they refer to relative remuneration in companies and 
universities of a comparable size.  This evidence that the differential declines for 
lower level executives also demonstrates that the progression to the top is much 
harder in the private sector, relative to the university sector.   
                                                 
13 Note that this implies that VCs receive about (2.5)
-1 = 0.4 times what private sector CEOs earn, or 60 




The scatter plots corresponding to Table 6 (for Levels 1 and 2 only) are given 
in Figure 3.  The plots give the clear visual impression that (i) the relationship 
between remuneration and size is approximately log-linear; and (ii) the size elasticity 
is more or less the same across all levels in the private and university sectors.  Also, 
differences in the levels of remuneration between the two sectors can be clearly seen 
from these plots.  Though not reproduced here, we tested whether the size elasticities 




  Table 7 gives the pooled OLS results for the private sector with size, year, 
level and industry dummies included. As can be seen, the size elasticity remains at 
around one-quarter when we consider either the top five executives (Panel A, “Whole 
sample”) or just the CEOs (Panel  B). The industry dummy variable coefficients show 
that private executive remuneration, not surprisingly perhaps, is highest in the 
financial sector and lowest for the “other” sector. Indeed, there is a marked difference 
between the average CEO remuneration in the financial sector compared with the 
other eight industrial sectors -- CEOs in finance earn almost 20 percent more than 
those in the next highest group, health care.  The finding with respect to the financial 
sector is consistent with Murphy (1999).  The coefficients of the year 2005 dummy 
indicate that on average executive remuneration increased by about 11 percent over 
the 2004-2005 period while CEO remuneration increased by about 7 percent. These 
increases are both greater than the rate of inflation.  
 
Insert Table 7 
 
  We can contrast the pay parity matrix between universities and the private 
sector. To hold constant size and the other determinants of pay, we construct the 
generic matrix from the coefficients of the level dummies in equation (1). That is, the 
first element of the first column is zero, while the 
th i  element (i ≥ 2) of this column is 
defined as  i1 i ˆ (i 2,...,5) π= γ = , where  i ˆ γ  is the estimated coefficient for level i. The 
remaining elements of the matrix can be derived from this first column. For the 
university (private sector), we use the estimated coefficients given in Table 4 (Table 
7) and Table 8 contains the results. These results reveal that as there is a consistent 
difference between the parity between similar pairs of executives in the university and 




example, we see that the parity between the second and third highest executives in the 
private sector is -25 percent, while it falls by about one half when we move to the 
university sector, where the same parity is -13 percent. Similarly, the parity between 
the second and the fourth levels is -42 percent for the private sector and only -21 
percent for the university sector.  These differences reflect the relatively flat 
remuneration structure that exists within universities as compared to the private 
sector.  In terms of tournament theory, this suggests that the contest for the top job is 
likely to be fought much harder in the private sector. This may come as a surprise to 
experienced observers of the workings of the labour market in academia.  A 
comparison of the pay parities for the various groups of universities (Table 3) and for 
the private sector (Table 8) suggests that the Go8 AEs have a pay structure that is 
closest to the private sector. 
 
7. Robustness Tests 
In Tables 4 and 5 above, we pooled data across universities and time. As we 
move through time, the number of universities as well as the number of levels of AE 
change to give us an unbalanced panel. To check the impact of this, we redo the 
results with a number of balanced panel samples in which the composition is held 
constant. We considered all possible balanced panels, with four and five levels of 
AEs, and with at least three years of data available in order to preserve a reasonable 
number of observations.  The list of possible balanced panels and the detailed results 
from re-estimating equation (1) using these are available from Clements and Izan 
(2007).  We present here the results from using only one of those panels as an 
example, and then summarise our findings. 
  As an illustration, Tables 9 to 11 present the results from one of the balanced 
panels which exclude level 5 AEs and data from 1999 and 2000.  The results are not 
too different from those presented using our unbalanced panels presented in Tables 3, 
4 and 5 respectively. 
  The results from using all the balanced panels can be summarised as follows: 
•  When we allow for the differing commencement of dates of the various panels 
and express the estimated growth of remuneration on an average annual basis, 
the use of a balanced panel has little impact, while the coefficient of the Go8 
dummy tends to rise, and the coefficients of the ATN and IRU remain 




•  The ranking of institutions on the basis of their dummy variable coefficients is 
not greatly affected by the use of the balanced panel, with the rank correlation 
estimated to be at least 0.9 in all cases, except one. 
•  The structure of the pay parity matrix for all universities remains broadly 
unchanged.  The structure can be summarised by the average gradient of the 
remuneration schedule, which takes the form (1/4)π14, when N=4 or (1/5)π15, 
when N=5.  This average gradient is more or less the same with the balanced 
panels. 
Insert Tables 9, 10 and 11 
 
  We also reestimated the model using other proxies for size, namely total 
assets, total student enrolments and total staff, with the results for the first two proxies 
presented in Table 12
14.  We find that the estimates for the time and level dummies 
remain relatively unchanged, but that the sensitivity to changes in size falls from its 
previous estimate of 0.25.  What is interesting however, is that the adjusted R
2  is 
highest when revenue is used as the size proxy, and that the introduction of the Go8 
dummy in regressions reported in Table 12 increases the adjusted R
2 markedly. This 
suggests that the ability to raise revenue through research grants is a factor that 
appears to influence AE remuneration, especially in the Go8.  This could in part 
explain the enthusiasm with which AEs encourage T&R academics to invest time and 
resources in attracting outside funding. 
 
8. Conclusions 
In recent years, universities have become more complex organisations, with 
the establishment of more elaborate administrative structures, and the appointment of 
senior academic executives to manage their affairs.  The growth in the number of 
these positions has attracted some attention, and raises interesting issues about the 
operation of the academic labour market.  The paper focuses on one of theses issues, 
namely, the nature of the remuneration structure for these executives. 
  We examine the remuneration provided to academic executives in Australian 
universities over the five-year period from 1999 to 2004, using information contained 
in annual reports.  We were able to analyse the differences in remuneration across the 
sector, and identify those universities that have been “over payers” and those that 
have been “under payers”.  Our analysis reveals some very interesting results: 
                                                 




•  As for the private sector, the size of universities, as measured by revenue, is an 
important determinant of remuneration.   
•  The sensitivity of remuneration to size is about one-quarter for both the 
university sector and the private sector.  
•  On average, after controlling for size, the Group of Eight universities pay their 
executives more than other universities. 
•  Two universities -- Queensland and Monash -- appear to pay consistently 
above the sector average.   
•  Over the period 1999-2004, the remuneration of academic executives has 
increased by more than 30 percent, which is about twice the increase in the 
salaries of teaching and research academics.  
The database allows us to examine the relativities in remuneration for staff at 
the various levels, and how remuneration progresses from one level to the next, 
through the construction of the “pay parity matrix”.  The elements of this matrix 
enable us to analyse the “steepness” of the stairway to the top.  According to 
tournament theory, the steeper the slope, the greater the competition to get to the top 
and the harder is the progression to higher levels.  We find that there are differences 
in the pay structure across universities, and that Go8 universities have the steepest 
progression to the top.   
Comparisons with the private sector indicate that controlling for size 
differences, on average, a ‘private sector’ CEO earns about 2.5 times that of a 
university VC, and the ‘private sector premium’ declines to about 1.6 times for the 
fifth highest executive. The size elasticities for both sectors appear to be about the 
same and interestingly, the stairway to the top for the university sector is about half as 
steep as that for the private sector, suggesting that it is a much harder climb to the top 
of the corporate ladder.  The Go8 universities have a pay parity matrix structure that is 
closest to that for the private sector. 
In this paper, our focus has been on the relationship between academic 
executive remuneration and the ‘size’ of universities.  An interesting dimension, 
which we have not explored explicitly here, but one that has received a great deal of 
attention in the literature on private sector executive remuneration, is the relationship 
between remuneration and performance.  If superior performance is to be rewarded 
more explicitly in the future in the form of higher remuneration of VCs and other 
university executives, then conceivably this market could become even more similar 




frequent remuneration device.  In view of the diverse objectives of universities, and 
their multiple stakeholders, this of course raises difficult issues of how to define 
appropriate performance metrics for VCs and other academic executives.  A possible 
future direction for research would be to investigate the workings of alternative 
performance metrics for the university sector, and how they could be/are linked to 
remuneration. 
In an interview broadcast on the Radio National
15, journalist Monica Attard in 
relating Macquarie University’s former VC’s remuneration of about $600,000 stated: 
[I]t is odd for most people that, essentially, an academic in a public 
institution can earn a salary that we normally equate with a salary 
that's earned in private enterprise. 
 
To that, the former VC, Di Yerbury replied: 
Nowhere near what I would have earned in private enterprise.    
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ACADEMIC EXECUTIVE REMUNERATION, 2004 
($’000) 
Standard deviation 












Dollars  Logs 
(×100) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
             
1.    Adelaide*  565 425 255 245  - 373  153  41 
2.    ANU*  525 275 275 235  - 328  133  36 
3.    Ballarat  335 215 195 185 185  223  64 25 
4.    Canberra  405 225 215 215 195  251  87 29 
5.    CQ  405 235 225 215  - 270  90 30 
6.    CSU  395 245 215 115  - 243  116  51 
7.    Curtin  455 225 225 225 215  269  104  32 
8.    ECU  475 245 245 235 215  283  108  32 
9.    Deakin  475 355 305 265 255  331  90 25 
10.    Griffith  465 315 305 285 285  331  76 20 
11.  JCU  345  225  -  -  -  285  85  30 
12.    LaTrobe  425 345 335 325 275  341  54 16 
13.  Macquarie  525  395 245 245 245  331  126  35 
14.  Melbourne*  545  395  355  305  -  400  103  25 
15.  Monash*  625  375  365  355  335  411  121  25 
16.  Murdoch  425  265  255  225  185  271  92  31 
17.  Newcastle  625  285  275  -  -  395  199  46 
18.    NSW*  1,095  435 285 255 245  463  361  63 
19.    Queensland*  905 475 345 335 315  475  248  44 
20.    QUT  NA NA NA NA NA  NA  NA  NA 
21.  RMIT  445  415  315  275  255  341  85  25 
22.    SA  455 265 265 255 235  295  90 26 
23.    SCU  275 215 205 195  - 223  36 15 
24.  SQ  305  215  205  -  -  242  55  22 
25.    Swinburne  255 195 195 185 185  203  29 13 
26.    Sydney*  575 425 315 295 285  379  123  30 
27.  Tasmania  355  215 215 205  - 248  72  26 
28.    USC  305  215  - - -  260  64  25 
29.    UTS  475 335 305 255 245  323  93 27 
30.    UWA*  455 325 295 265 255  319  81 23 
31.    Victoria  315 285 255 245 245  269  30 11 
32.  Western Sydney  495  275 275 265 205 303  111 32 
33.    Wollongong  445 295 255 225 215  287  94 29 
            
Mean  474 301 267 248 242  311  105  29 
SD-  dollars  169  81 49 50 42  68  - - 
SD-logs  (×  100)  31 26 18 22 17  21  - - 
             
Notes: 1. The heading of column 6, “average of 5
th+ highest”, refers to the average of the 5
th or lower-level 
executives if their remuneration is not too dissimilar. 
































































































































































































AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 2004 
                                         (Logarithmic ratios ×100) 
Pay relative to VC 










Mean  Standard 
deviation 
1. Adelaide  -28  -80  -84  -  -64  31 
2. ANU  -65  -65  -80  -  -70  9 
3. Ballarat  -44  -54  -59  -59  -54  7 
4. Canberra  -59  -63  -63  -73  -65  6 
5. CQ  -54  -59  -63  -  -59  4 
6.CSU -48  -61  -123  -  -77  40 
7. Curtin  -70  -70  -70  -75  -72  2 
8. ECU  -66  -66  -70  -79  -71  6 
9.  Deakin  -29  -44  -58  -62 -48 15 
10. Griffith  -39  -42  -49  -49  -45  5 
11. JCU  -43  -  -  -  -43  - 
12.  LaTrobe  -21  -24  -27  -44 -29 10 
13.  Macquarie  -28  -76  -76  -76 -64 24 
14. Melbourne  -32  -43  -58  -  -44  13 
15. Monash  -51  -54  -57  -62  -56  5 
16.  Murdoch  -47  -51  -64  -83 -61 16 
17. Newcastle  -79  -82  -  -  -80  3 
18. NSW  -92  -135  -146  -150  -131  26 
19. Queensland  -64  -96  -99  -106  -91  18 
20. QUT  NA NA NA  NA  NA  NA 
21.  RMIT  -7  -35  -48  -56 -36 21 
22. SA  -54  -54  -58  -66  -58  6 
23. SCU  -25  -29  -34  -  -29  5 
24. SQ  -35  -40  -  -  -37  3 
25. Swinburne  -27  -27  -32  -32  -29  3 
26.  Sydney  -30  -60  -67  -70 -57 18 
27. Tasmania  -50  -50  -55  -  -52  3 
28. USC  -35  -  -  -  -35  - 
29.  UTS  -35  -44  -62  -66 -52 15 
30.  UWA  -34  -43  -54  -58 -47 11 
31. Victoria  -10  -21  -25  -25  -20  7 
32.  Western  Sydney -59  -59  -62  -88 -67 14 
33.  Wollongong  -41  -56  -68  -73 -59 14 
           
         
Mean  -44  -56  -65  -69 -56 12 
Standard deviation  19  23  26  26  22  - 








 FIGURE 2 
 
STAIRWAY TO THE TOP 
SELECTED UNIVERSITIES, 1999-2004 
 
(Logarithmic ratios ×100) 
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Notes: 1. For a given institution and a given level in the organisational hierarchy, the length of the 
corresponding column is the average over time of the log ratio (×100) of remuneration of this 
position to that of the top position. The solid dots indicate the values of this log ratio in the 
individual years. 
 





PAY PARITY MATRICES,  
AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 1999-2004 
 

















A. All Universities 
1. VC  0  42.47  55.80  64.85  74.05 
2. 2nd Highest  -42.47  0  13.33  22.38  31.58 
3. 3rd Highest  -55.80  -13.33  0  9.05  18.25 
4. 4th Highest  -64.85  -22.38  -9.05  0  9.20 
5. Average of 5th + Highest  -74.05  -31.58  -18.25  -9.20  0 
       
B. Group of Eight 
1. VC  0  43.94  62.37  71.93  85.73 
2. 2nd Highest  -43.94  0  18.44  27.99  41.80 
3. 3rd Highest  -62.37  -18.44  0.00  9.55  23.36 
4. 4th Highest  -71.93  -27.99  -9.55  0.00  13.81 
5. Average of 5
th + Highest  -85.73  -41.80  -23.36  -13.81  0 
       
C. Australian Technology Network 
1. VC  0  36.36  50.33  57.70  63.97 
2. 2nd Highest  -36.36  0  13.97  21.35  27.61 
3. 3rd Highest  -50.33  -13.97  0  7.37  13.64 
4. 4th Highest  -57.70  -21.35  -7.37  0  6.27 
5. Average of 5th  + Highest  -63.97  -27.61  -13.64  -6.27  0 
       
D. Innovative Research Universities 
1. VC  0  48.42  59.82  67.59  75.82 
2. 2nd Highest  -48.42  0  11.40  19.17  27.40 
3. 3rd Highest  -59.82  -11.40  0  7.77  16.00 
4. 4th Highest  -67.59  -19.17  -7.77  0  8.23 
5. Average of 5
th +  Highest  -75.82  -27.40  -16.00  -8.23  0 
       
E. Other 
1. VC  0  41.48  51.26  61.06  70.41 
2. 2nd Highest  -41.48  0  9.78  19.58  28.93 
3. 3rd Highest  -51.26  -9.78  0  9.80  19.15 
4. 4th Highest  -61.06  -19.58  -9.80  0  9.35 
5. Average of 5
th +  Highest  -70.41  -28.93  -19.15  -9.35  0 















REMUNERATION AND SIZE, AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 
 POOLED ACROSS LEVELS AND YEARS, 1999-2004 
 
ict ct ict log P =α + βlogS + year,  level and group dummies + ε  
 
Variable  A. No University group 
dummies     B. Go8 dummy   
C. Dummies for  
University groups 
                    
Intercept   8.0265  (37.32)  [<0.001]   9.3046 (38.54) [<0.001] 9.3303 (3.59)  [<0.001]
log S    0.2414  (21.57)  [<0.001]   0.1730 (13.17) [<0.001] 0.1716 (10.95)  [<0.001]
                  Year dummies 
(Base = 1999)                   
2000 0.0713  (2.84)  [0.0046]   0.0743 (3.03) [0.0028] 0.0744  (3.00) [0.0028]
2001 0.1047  (3.92)  [<0.001]   0.1194 (4.59) [<0.001] 0.1199  (4.42) [<0.001]
2002 0.1592  (6.47)  [<0.001]   0.1789 (7.36) [<0.001] 0.1794  (7.17) [<0.001]
2003 0.2396  (9.36)  [<0.001]   0.2625 (10.46) [<0.001] 0.2631 (10.21)  [<0.001]
2004 0.2666  (10.80)  [<0.001]   0.2915 (11.93) [<0.001] 0.2922 (11.49)  [<0.001]
                Level in hierarchy after VC 
(Base = VC)                 
Level 2  -0.4247  (-18.24) [<0.001]   -0.4247 (-18.88) [<0.001] -0.4247 (-18.97)  [<0.001]
Level 3  -0.5568  (-25.30) [<0.001]   -0.5543 (-25.97) [<0.001] -0.5543 (-26.04)  [<0.001]
Level 4  -0.6348  (-28.60) [<0.001]   -0.6328 (-29.26) [<0.001] -0.6328 (-29.38)  [<0.001]
Level 5  -0.7047  (-29.61) [<0.001]   -0.6921 (-30.18) [<0.001] -0.6922 (-30.42)  [<0.001]
                University group 
(Base = Other)               
      Go8  -        0.1419 (7.10) [<0.001] 0.1439  (5.21) [<0.001]
     ATN  -        -      0.0039  (0.21)  [0.8320]
     IRU  -        -      -0.0010  (-0.06)  [0.9546]
                   
Adjusted R
2 0.7555       0.7719    0.7713     
No. of obs.  734       734     734    
F-statistic 227.55  [<0.001]      226.56 [<0.001]  191.19  [<0.001]   
                               













REMUNERATION, SIZE AND INSTITUTIONS AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES 
POOLED ACROSS LEVELS AND YEARS, 1999-2004 
 
ict ct ic logP = α +βlogS + year and level dummies+institution dummies+ε  
 
 
Variable    A. Whole sample    B. Vice-Chancellors only 
Intercept    14.7023 (7.61)  [<0.001]    17.8042 (3.76)  [<0.001] 
Log S    -0.1236 (-1.21)  [0.2278]   -0.2898 (-1.15)  [0.2537] 
               Year dummies 
(Base = 1999)                
2000   0.0845 (3.87)  [<0.001]   0.1026 (1.89)  [0.0612] 
2001   0.1581 (5.12)  [<0.001]   0.2655 (2.63)  [0.0095] 
2002   0.2363 (7.48)  [<0.001]  0.3238 (3.46)  [<0.001] 
2003   0.3317 (9.12)  [<0.001]  0.4525 (4.46)  [<0.001] 
2004   0.3813 (8.75)  [<0.001]  0.4878 (4.03)  [<0.001] 
             Level in Hierarchy after VC 
(Base = VC)              
Level 2    -0.4247 (-21.45) [<0.001]   -     
Level 3    -0.5581 (-29.30) [<0.001]   -     
Level 4    -0.6454 (-33.80) [<0.001]   -     
Level 5    -0.7218 (-36.47) [<0.001]   -     
                          
 





TABLE 5 (Continued) 
 
REMUNERATION, SIZE AND INSTITUTIONS AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES 
POOLED ACROSS LEVELS AND YEARS, 1999-2004 
 
ict ct ic logP = α +βlogS + year and level dummies+institution dummies+ε  
 
Variable    A. Whole sample    B. Vice-Chancellors only 
               Universities 
(Base = JCU)             
1. USC    -0.2201 (-1.22) [0.2210]   -0.5708 (-1.36) [0.1778] 
2. SQ    -0.0780 (-1.17) [0.2434]   -0.2947 (-1.97) [0.0512] 
3. Ballarat    -0.0537 (-0.76) [0.4479]   -0.2530 (-1.67) [0.0981] 
4. SCU    0.0534 (0.60) [0.5507]   -0.0343 (-0.16) [0.8758] 
5. CSU    0.0918 (2.26) [0.0240]   0.1123 (2.10) [0.0374] 
6. Murdoch    0.1103 (2.71) [0.0069]   0.0630 (0.97) [0.3317] 
7. Tasmania     0.1272 (3.20) [0.0014]   0.0487 (0.46) [0.6458] 
8. Canberra      0.1457 (2.26) [0.0241]   -0.0019 (-0.01) [0.9891] 
9. Swinburne    0.1583 (3.63) [<0.001]   0.1190 (1.02) [0.3082] 
  10. Newcastle     0.2109 (3.69) [<0.001]   0.2639 (1.76) [0.0808] 
  11. CQ    0.2653 (5.25) [<0.001]   0.0446 (0.48) [0.6298] 
  12. ECU    0.3104 (7.95) [<0.001]   0.3152 (4.38) [<0.001] 
  13. Griffith    0.3266 (4.73) [<0.001]   0.4067 (2.51) [0.0134] 
  14. SA    0.3461 (6.28) [<0.001]   0.3895 (2.98) [0.0034] 
  15. Wollongong    0.3609  (7.84)  [<0.001]   0.4339 (4.08) [<0.001] 
  16. Victoria    0.3787 (6.00) [<0.001]   0.5235 (2.33) [0.0211] 
  17. Curtin    0.3905 (5.22) [<0.001]   0.4677 (2.41) [0.0172] 
  18. UTS    0.4100 (6.16) [<0.001]   0.3694 (2.21) [0.0288] 
  19. Western Sydney    0.4157 (6.72) [<0.001]   0.5687 (3.83) [0.0002] 
  20. La Trobe    0.4174 (6.47) [<0.001]   0.5384 (3.24) [0.0015] 
  21. RMIT    0.4368 (3.96) [<0.001]   0.5676 (2.12) [0.0359] 
  22. QUT    0.4617 (6.24) [<0.001]   0.5293 (2.86) [0.005] 
  23. Macquarie     0.4774 (7.67) [<0.001]   0.6521 (4.51) [<0.001] 
  24. Deakin    0.5167 (7.76) [<0.001]   0.5721 (3.26) [0.0014] 
  25. ANU    0.5346 (4.96) [<0.001]   0.6455 (2.38) [0.0191] 
  26. Adelaide     0.5416 (4.83) [<0.001]   0.7779 (2.13) [0.0353] 
  27. UWA    0.5517 (6.96) [<0.001]   0.6136 (3.00) [0.0033] 
  28. Sydney    0.6796 (4.45) [<0.001]   0.9569 (2.49) [0.0139] 
  29. Melbourne      0.7534 (4.51) [<0.001]   0.9199 (2.21) [0.0289] 
  30. NSW    0.7686 (4.55) [<0.001]   1.1419 (2.51) [0.0133] 
  31. Queensland   0.8780  (6.07)  [<0.001]   1.3201 (3.70) [0.003] 
  32. Monash    0.9462 (6.16) [<0.001]   1.2078 (2.92) [0.0042] 
               
Adjusted R
2    0.8301      0.5999   
No of observations    734       164    
F-Statistic     86.27 [<0.001]        7.43 [<0.001]     
               
Note: t-values, based on White’s standard errors, are given in parentheses and p-values are given in 
brackets.  
   
TABLE 6 
REMUNERATION AND SIZE: 
AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES AND UNIVERSITIES, BY LEVEL, 2004 
= α+β + +ε cc c logPl o gSp r i v a t e s e c t o r d u m m y  
 
  Level One    Level Two    Level Three    Level Four    Level Five 
Intercept   7.9669 (20.53) [<0.001]   7.6841 (22.48) [<0.001]   7.4616 (22.11) [<0.001]   6.9501 (20.29) [<0.001]   6.9428 (19.10) [<0.001] 
log S   0.2580 (13.69) [<0.001]   0.2501 (15.05) [<0.001]   0.2555 (15.64) [<0.001]   0.2767 (16.75) [<0.001]   0.2758 (15.85) [<0.001] 
Private  sector  dummy  0.8977 (7.06) [<0.001]   0.7643 (6.87) [<0.001]   0.6207 (5.60) [<0.001]   0.5354 (4.72) [<0.001]   0.4606 (3.66) [<0.001] 
                              
Adjusted R
2  0.4477       0.4891      0.5004      0.5350      0.5269   
No.  of  obs  289       282       271       260       237    
F-statistic 117.74  [<0.001]      135.48 [<0.001]     136.23 [<0.001]     149.96 [<0.001]     132.43 [<0.001]  
                              
Note: t-values, based on White’s standard errors, are given in parentheses and p-values are given in brackets  
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FIGURE 4 
REMUNERATION AND SIZE: 
AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES AND UNIVERSITIES, 2004 
(Legend: ▲= university;    =  company) 
I. ALL OBSERVATIONS  II. CENTRE OF GRAVITY 
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B. Level Two 




log (pay)  = 7.68 + 0.25 log (revenue)  
                   (0.34)   (0.02) 
                   + 0.76 (company dummy) 
                    (0.11)                                 




















REMUNERATION AND SIZE, AUSTRALIAN COMPANIES,  
POOLED ACROSS YEARS AND LEVELS, 2004-2005 
 














Variable             A. Whole sample  B. CEOs  
           
Intercept   8.9254 (52.23) [<0.001]  8.7037 (21.66) [<0.001]
log S    0.2417 (30.10) [<0.001]  0.2536 (13.50)  [<0.001]
2005 dummy (Base = 2004)    0.1108 (4.27)  [<0.001]  0.0726 (1.16)  [0.2470]
             Level dummies 
(Base = CEO)              
     Level 2    -0.5537 (-13.03)[<0.001]  -     
     Level 3    -0.7990 (-19.11)[<0.001]  -     
     Level 4    -0.9728 (-23.15)[<0.001]  -     
     Level 5   -1.0928 (-25.43)[<0.001]  -     
         Industry Dummies 
(Base = Other)          
     IT    0.0823 (1.36)  [0.1747]  -0.0398 (-0.25)  [0.8042]
     Materials    0.1383 (2.25)  [0.0243]  0.1110 (-0.75)  [0.4535]
     Industrials    0.1609 (2.61)  [0.0090]  0.2440 (-1.54)  [0.1234]
     Energy    0.1988 (2.80)  [0.0052]  0.2149 (-1.22)  [0.2214]
     Consumer Discretionary    0.2314 (3.77)  [0.0002]  0.2494 (1.67)  [0.0962]
     Consumer Staples    0.2643 (3.60)  [0.0003]  0.3230 (1.75)  [0.0813]
     Health care    0.3247 (4.92)  [<0.001]  0.3981 (2.40)  [0.0166]
     Financial    0.5887 (8.22)  [<0.001]  0.5508 (2.40)  [0.0009]
              
Adjusted R
2   0.5433    0.4327   
No. of observations    2478     519    
F-statistic   211.53 [<0.001]  40.52  [<0.001]  
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TABLE 8 
PAY PARITY MATRICES 














A. Australian Universities 
 
1. VC  0  42.27  55.68  63.48       70.47 
2. 2
nd Highest  -42.27  0  13.41  21.21  28.20 
3. 3
rd Highest  -55.68  -13.41  0  7.80  14.79 
4. 4
th Highest  -63.48  -21.21  -7.80  0  6.99 
5. Average of 5
th + Highest  -70.47  -28.20  -14.79  -6.99  0 
          
          
B. Private Sector 
1. CEO 
 




nd Highest  -55.37  0  24.53  41.91  53.91 
3. 3
rd Highest  -79.90  -24.53  0  17.38  29.38 
4. 4
th Highest  -97.28  -41.91  -17.38  0  12.00 
5. Average of 5
th + Highest  -109.28  -53.91  -29.38  -12.00  0 
          
          
C. Private Sector- Australian Universities 
1. CEO – VC 
 




nd Highest -13.13  0  11.25  20.85  25.93 
3. 3
rd Highest  -24.38  -11.25  0  9.60  14.68 
4. 4
th Highest  -33.98  -20.85  -9.60  0  5.08 
5. Average of 5
th Highest  -39.06  -25.93  -14.68  -5.08  0 
                 
 
Notes: 1. Panel A is based on Table 4, Panel A. 
                        2. Panel B is based on Table 7, Panel A.  
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TABLE 9 
PAY PARITY MATRICES 
 
AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSTIIES 





Level i  
VC  2nd highest 3rd highest 4th highest 
A. All Universities 
1  0 45.00  58.14  67.28 
2 -45.00 0 13.14  22.28 
3 -58.14  -13.14 0  9.14 
4 -67.28  -22.28  -9.14  0 
     
B. Group of Eight 
1  0 46.65  64.12  75.5 
2 -46.65 0 17.47  28.85 
3 -64.12  -17.46 0 11.38 
4 -75.50  -28.84  -11.38 0 
     
C. Australian Technology Network 
1 0  35.00  50.85  59.63 
2 -35.00 0 15.85  24.63 
3 -50.85  -15.85 0  8.78 
4 -59.63  -24.62  -8.77  0 
     
D. Innovative Research Universities 
1  0 46.52  60.84  67.46 
2 -46.52 0 14.32  20.94 
3 -60.84  -14.31 0  6.62 
4 -67.46  -20.94  -6.63  0 
     
E. Other 
1 0  46.55  54.3  62.88 
2 -46.55 0  7.75  16.33 
3 -54.30  -7.75  0  8.58 
4 -62.88  -16.32  -8.57  0 





REMUNERATION AND SIZE, AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES 
POOLED ACROSS LEVELS AND YEARS, 2001-2004 
 
BALANCED PANEL, FOUR LEVELS 
 
ict ct ict log P =α + βlogS + year,  level and group dummies + ε  
 
 






  Variable  A. No University group 
dummies     B. Go8 dummy    
C. Dummies for  
University groups 
                      
Intercept   7.9131  (25.77)  [<0.001]   9.7290  (22.69) [<0.001]  9.8698  (18.67)  [<0.001] 
log S    0.2550  (16.33)  [<0.001]   0.1594  (7.40)  [<0.001]  0.1513 (5.59) [0.0120] 
                 Year dummies 
(Base = 2001)                  
2002 0.0437  (1.52)  [0.1292]   0.0505  (1.89)  [0.0591]   0.0511 (1.91) [0.0566] 
2003 0.1300  (4.51)  [<0.001]   0.1419  (5.45) [<0.001]   0.1429  (5.58)  [<0.001] 
2004 0.1327  (4.90)  [<0.001]   0.1494  (5.97) [<0.001]   0.1508  (6.18)  [<0.001] 
                Level in hierarchy after VC 
(Base = VC)                 
Level 2  -0.4586  (-13.79) [<0.001]   -0.4586  (-14.51) [<0.001]  -0.4586  (-14.55)  [<0.001] 
Level 3  -0.5838  (-18.69) [<0.001]   -0.5838  (-19.44) [<0.001]  -0.5838  (-19.46)  [<0.001] 
Level 4  -0.6729  (-21.39) [<0.001]   -0.6729  (-22.22) [<0.001]  -0.6729  (-22.28)  [<0.001] 
                 University group 
(Base = Other)                  
      Go8  -        0.1743  (5.22) [<0.001]   0.1956  (4.47)  [<0.001] 
     ATN  -        -        0.0086  (0.28)  [0.7814] 
     IRU  -        -        0.0492  (2.00)  [0.0459] 
                     
Adjusted R
2 0.7373       0.7618       0.7627     
No. of obs.  368       368      368    
F-statistic 148.11  [<0.001]      147.68 [<0.001]     118.95 [<0.001]   




REMUNERATION, SIZE AND INSTITUTIONS, AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES 
POOLED ACROSS LEVELS AND YEARS, 2001-2004 
BALANCED PANEL, FOUR LEVELS 
 
ict ct ic logP = α +βlogS + year and level dummies+institution dummies+ε  
 
Variable    A. Whole sample    B. Vice-Chancellors only 
Intercept     12.2020 (3.58)  [0.0004]    16.6859 (1.69)  [0.0960] 
Log S    0.0214  (0.12)  [0.9037]    -0.2145 (-0.42)  [0.6773] 
               Year dummies 
(Base = 2001)                
2002   0.0603  (2.33)  [0.0201]    0.0648 (0.83)  [0.4098] 
2003   0.1590  (5.13)  [<0.001]    0.1895 (2.01)  [0.0481] 
2004   0.1736  (4.48)  [<0.001]    0.1506 (1.33)  [0.1890] 
           Level in Hierarchy after VC 
(Base = VC)            
Level 2    -0.4586  (-16.28) [<0.001]    -     
Level 3    -0.5838  (-22.29) [<0.001]    -     
Level 4    -0.6729  (-26.00) [<0.001]    -     
 Universities 
(Base = Swinburne)             
1. Tasmania    0.0037 (0.06) [0.9489]    -0.0871 (-0.46)  [0.6485] 
2. SCU    0.0914 (0.52) [0.6044]    -0.0188 (-0.04)  [0.9714] 
3. CQ    0.0953 (1.49) [0.1374]    -0.0908 (-0.47)  [0.6426] 
4. Murdoch    0.1264 (1.49) [0.1365]    0.0306 (0.12)  [0.9086] 
5. Canberra    0.1364 (0.93) [0.3512]    0.0055 (0.01)  [0.9901] 
6. Griffith    0.1653 (2.15) [0.0320]    0.3125 (1.32)  [0.1922] 
7. ECU    0.1839 (3.86) [0.0001]    0.3173 (1.76)  [0.0830] 
8. RMIT    0.2172 (1.45) [0.1486]    0.4016 (0.96)  [0.3385] 
9. Curtin    0.2234 (2.55) [0.0112]    0.3834 (1.31)  [0.1956] 
  10. Wollongong    0.2417 (5.70)  [<0.001]    0.3681 (2.10)  [0.0394] 
  11. Victoria    0.2605 (4.00)  [<0.001]    0.4557 (2.53)  [0.0139] 
  12. Western Sydney   0.2787 (4.42)  [<0.001]    0.4907 (2.26)  [0.0270] 
  13. UTS    0.2931 (4.04)  [<0.001]    0.3439 (1.45)  [0.1510] 
  14. La Trobe    0.2999 (4.17)  [<0.001]    0.4732 (2.21)  [0.0303] 
  15. ANU    0.3294 (2.40) [0.0170]    0.5663 (1.35)  [0.1817] 
  16. Macquarie    0.3402 (5.24)  [<0.001]    0.5747 (2.68)  [0.0093] 
  17. UWA    0.3791 (4.05)  [<0.001]    0.5283 (1.82)  [0.0734] 
  18. Sydney    0.4148 (1.81) [0.0713]    0.7939 (1.18)  [0.2422] 
  19. Adelaide    0.4355 (3.06) [0.0024]    0.7605 (2.85)  [0.0059] 
  20. Melbourne    0.5034 (2.04) [0.0426]    0.8254 (1.15)  [0.2564] 
  21. Queensland    0.6601 (3.22) [0.0014]    1.1722 (1.97)  [0.0533] 
  22. Monash    0.6818 (3.09) [0.0021]    1.0895 (1.73)  [0.0877] 
              
Adjusted R
2    0.8184       0.4711    
No of observations    368       92    
F-Statistic    58.04 [<0.001]     4.11 [<0.001]   
              





REMUNERATION AND SIZE, AUSTRALIAN UNIVERSITIES, 
 POOLED ACROSS LEVELS AND YEARS, 1999-2004 
ALTERNATIVE SIZE MEASURES 
 































Note: t-values, based on White’s standard errors, are given in parentheses and p-values are given in brackets. 
  Size = Total assets    Size = Total Student Enrolments 
Variable  A. No University group 
dummies    B. With Go8 dummy   
C. No University group 
 dummies 
  D. With G08 dummy 
                             
Intercept   8.8967  (48.89)  [<0.001]   10.2342  (43.91)  [<0.001]   11.5118  (78.46)  [<0.001]    11.4978 (98.04) [<0.001] 
Log  sSize  0.1875  (20.90)  [<0.001]   0.1188 (10.38)  [<0.001]  0.1180 (8.03) [<0.001]   0.1135 (9.78)  [<0.001] 
                         Year dummies 
(Base = 1999)                          
2000  0.0782 (3.04) [0.0025]    0.0810  (3.17)  [0.0016]  0.0965 (3.14) [0.0018]    0.0644 (2.39)  [0.0171] 
2001 0.1319  (4.91)  [<0.001]   0.1412  (5.33)  [<0.001]   0.1221 (3.61) [0.0003]    0.1138 (3.89)  [<0.001] 
2002  0.1914 (7.75)  [<0.001]   0.2052  (8.24)  [<0.001]  0.1830 (6.39) [<0.001]   0.1776 (6.76)  [<0.001] 
2003  0.2750  (10.62)  [<0.001]   0.2920 (11.37)  [<0.001]  0.2958 (9.40) [<0.001]   0.2940 (10.58)  [<0.001] 
2004 0.3009  (12.28)  [<0.001]   0.3210  (12.91)  [<0.001]   0.3137  (10.86)  [<0.001]    0.3163 (11.97)  [<0.001] 
                          Level in hierarchy after VC 
(Base = VC)                          
Level 2  -0.4249  (-17.75)  [<0.001]   -0.4248  (-18.53) [<0.001]   -0.4223  (-13.97)  [<0.001]    -0.4223 (-17.04) [<0.001] 
Level 3  -0.5545  (-24.36)  [<0.001]   -0.5520  (-25.28) [<0.001]   -0.5468  (-19.22)  [<0.001]    -0.5509 (-23.25) [<0.001] 
Level 4  -0.6315  (-27.48)  [<0.001]   -0.6295  (-28.48) [<0.001]   -0.6177  (-22.66)  [<0.001]    -0.6276 (-27.22) [<0.001] 
Level 5  -0.7035  (-28.54)  [<0.001]   -0.6881  (-29.64) [<0.001]   -0.7060  (-24.03)  [<0.001]    -0.6958 (-26.85) [<0.001] 
                         University group 
(Base = Non Go8                          
      Go8  -        0.1674  (6.99)  [<0.001]   -        0.2668 (14.20)  [<0.001] 
                            
Adjusted R
2 0.7326       0.7545       0.6512       0.7691    
No. of obs.  734       734     551       551    
F-statistic 201.85  [<0.001]      205.79  [<0.001]     103.67  [<0.001]      167.50 [<0.001]   